Researchers from the University of Maryland and the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology have demonstrated that users who hide their real name or profile picture on messaging apps can still be identified by correlating data across multiple platforms.

The study, released this week, focused on Telegram, WhatsApp, Tinder and South Korea's KakaoTalk. It shows that attackers can combine basic app features and publicly available metadata to uncover a person's real name, phone number and even regular locations without breaking end-to-end encryption or reading private messages.

What the Research Found

By examining how each app handles contact information, the researchers built a step-by-step scenario that any person with modest technical ability could follow. The key insight is that many apps allow users to share a phone number as a primary identifier. When the same number is reused on several services, an attacker who gains access to that number on one platform can query the others for additional clues.

In the demonstration, a user created a Telegram account with a fake name and no profile picture. The same phone number was also registered on a second messaging service and on Tinder. Using Telegram's "invite by phone" feature, the attacker retrieved the phone number. On the second messaging app, the attacker queried the contact list and obtained the user's real name, which is often displayed when the number is saved in a phone's address book. Finally, the attacker examined the Tinder profile, which frequently lists a hometown, recent check-ins or a set of photos that can be geotagged, to infer places the person visits regularly.

The researchers stress that none of these steps required sophisticated hacking tools, zero-day exploits or large computing resources. The methods rely on ordinary app functions such as contact lookup, profile view and location-related fields that are deliberately designed for user convenience.

Why This Matters for Users

Many people assume that using a pseudonym, removing a profile picture or relying on encrypted messaging is enough to stay anonymous online. The study shows that anonymity is fragile when a single phone number is linked across several services. Once an attacker pieces together the data points, they can build a profile that includes the user's legal name, phone number and a map of frequented locations.

Such information can be used for targeted phishing, stalking, extortion or even physical surveillance. For businesses, the risk extends to corporate accounts where employees may use personal devices for work communication, potentially exposing internal contacts and office locations.

How the Affected Platforms Responded

Following the publication of the findings, the four platforms announced immediate changes to limit the ease of data aggregation.

  • WhatsApp and Telegram now restrict the number of times a user can request contact-related information within a short period, adding a cooldown timer that reduces rapid probing.
  • Both services have extended account lockout periods for accounts that trigger repeated failed lookup attempts, making automated scripts less effective.
  • Tinder has introduced a verification step that masks certain location fields unless the user explicitly opts in, and it blocks automated scraping of profile data.
  • KakaoTalk has updated its API to require additional user consent before exposing phone-number-based lookup results to third-party apps.

These adjustments aim to raise the cost of the simple, multi-app linking technique demonstrated in the research.

Technical Background: How Apps Share Metadata

Most messaging apps use a phone number as a unique identifier because it is easy for users to remember and it simplifies contact synchronization across devices. When a user registers, the app stores the number in its server database and often links it to a user-chosen display name. Even if the display name is a pseudonym, the underlying number remains constant.

Many apps expose a limited set of metadata through their user interface or API. For example, WhatsApp allows users to see the name associated with a phone number if that number is saved in the viewer's address book. Telegram offers a "find contacts" feature that returns any registered users matching a supplied number. Tinder's profile pages frequently contain a "city" field and may display the distance from the viewer, which can be reverse-engineered to estimate the user's location.

When these pieces of data are collected from several apps, they can be cross-referenced. A simple spreadsheet can match a phone number to a name from one source and to a location from another, producing a clear identity picture.

Potential Risks and Real-World Scenarios

Consider a college student who creates a Telegram account under the name "ShadowFox" and joins a private group discussing politics. The same phone number is used for a WhatsApp account that contacts classmates, and the student also signs up for Tinder to meet people locally. An adversary who obtains the phone number from a public Telegram group can then look up the WhatsApp contact list, discover the student's real name, and view the Tinder profile that lists a university campus as a frequent location. The adversary now knows where the student lives, studies and possibly works.

In a corporate context, an employee might use a personal phone number for both a work-related WhatsApp group and a personal dating app. If an attacker gains the number from the work group, they could locate the employee's home address via the dating profile, creating a vector for social engineering attacks against the company.

What Users Can Do Right Now

While the platforms roll out technical safeguards, users can adopt simple habits to reduce exposure:

  1. Use separate phone numbers for different categories of apps. Virtual numbers or secondary SIM cards can help keep work, personal and dating identities apart.
  2. Limit the amount of personal information shared on dating profiles. Avoid listing exact hometowns, schools or workplaces that can be triangulated.
  3. Review privacy settings on each app. Some services allow you to hide your phone number from other users or restrict who can see your profile picture.
  4. Periodically check the list of apps that have access to your contacts and revoke permissions for those you do not use regularly.
  5. Consider using an email-based login where the service permits it, as email addresses are less directly tied to a physical location than phone numbers.

What Comes Next

The research team plans to extend the study to additional platforms that rely on phone numbers, such as Signal and Viber, to see whether similar linking techniques are possible. They also intend to explore mitigation strategies that could be built into app architectures, such as zero-knowledge proofs for contact verification.

Regulators in several jurisdictions have expressed interest in the findings, noting that data aggregation across services may raise privacy concerns under existing consumer protection laws. Ongoing dialogue between app developers, privacy advocates and lawmakers is expected to shape future guidelines on cross-app data handling.

For now, the key takeaway for users is that anonymity on a single app does not guarantee privacy across the broader digital ecosystem. Vigilance, distinct identifiers and careful profile management remain the most effective defenses.